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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC METALS COMPANY, 
DIVISION OF A.M. CASTLE 
& COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Third Party 
and 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
BANK OF SALT LAKE, 
Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
vs. 
OLYMPUS HEATING AND AIR 





Appeal from a judgment of the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff Pacific Metals 
Co. against the Defendants Tracy-Collins Bank and 
Trust Co., hereinafter referred as Tracy, and the 
Bank of Salt Lake for the conversion of a check in 
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the principal amount of $5,321.70, interest and costs. 
(R. 1-4) 
On or about October 18, 1965, Mayne Plumbing 
and Heating Co., hereinafter ref erred to as Mayne, 
issued its check, the check in question, drawn on the 
Bank of Salt Lake and payable to Olympus Heating 
and Air Condition, hereinafter referred as Olym-
pus, and Pacific Metals Co., as joint payees in the 
amount of $5,321.70, and delivered it to Olympus. 
An employee of the latter stamped the check with a 
stamp as follows: (R. 29-37) 
PAY TO THE ORDER OF 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT AH 
FOR DEPOSIT ONLY 
OLYMPUS HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING 
PAYROLL ACCOUNT 
02 12 605 0 
The check was then deposited with the Defen-
dant Tracy without the endorsement of Pacific Me-
tals Co. Tracy credited the account of Olympus and 
then forwarded the check through regular banking 
channels for collection to the Bank of Salt Lake hav-
ing stamped on it: 
31-61 PAY ANY BANK 31-61 
P.E.G. 
TRACY-COLLINS 
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
31-61 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 31-61 
(R. 29-37) 
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Opon receipt of the check by the Bank of Salt 
Lake, it transferred funds in the face amount of the 
check to the collecting bank Tracy, after debiting 
the account of Mayne. (R. 29-37) 
The Plaintiff Pacific Metals not having receiv-
ed any of the funds from the check, brought this 
action against both Tracy and the Bank of Salt Lake 
for recovery of the face amount of the check. The 
Bank of Salt Lake filed its Cross-Complaint against 
Tracy, alleging that, if Plaintiff obtained judgment 
against it for any amount of the check, the Bank of 
Salt Lake is entitled to judgment against Tracy for 
the same amount, and Tracy filed a counter-claim 
against the Bank of Salt Lake, alleging that, if 
Plaintiff obtained judgment against it for any 
amount of the check, then Tracy is entitled to judg-
ment against the Bank of Salt Lake for the same 
amount. (R. 1-4, 11-13, 37-38) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, granted a 
Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and 
against the Defendant Tracy for a conversion of 
the check in the sum of $5,978.41 interest and costs 
denied the Defendant Tracy's Motion for Summary 
.Judgment against the Plaintiff, denied the Plain-
tiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against the 
Defendant Bank of Salt Lake and granted the Bank 
of Salt Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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against the Defendant Bank of Salt Lake and grant-
ed the Bank of Salt Lake's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Tracy and the Plaintiff no causes 
of actions. (R. 113-114, 143-144) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant Tracy seeks to reverse Plain-
tiff's Summary Judgment, a reversal of the Judg-
ment denying the Defendant Tracy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff Pacific 
Metals Co. and an Order directing the District 
Court to enter Judgment in favor of the Defendant 
Tracy and against the Plaintiff Pacific Metals Co. 
(R. 135-136) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mayne, a depositor of the Bank of Salt Lake, and 
not a party to this lawsuit, had a contract for cer-
tain work to be performed on the East High School 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Olympus, a depositor of 
Tracy, was one on Mayne's subcontractors on that 
particular job. (Brown dep. 3-5, Stott dep. 3-5) 
Olympus purchased materials from the Plain-
tiff Pacific Metals and others for use in the perfor-
mance of its sub-contract with Mayne. It also had 
a payroll, overhead, purchase of equipment and oth-
er expenses to meet in connection with this job. 
(Stott dep. R 12, 22, 25) 
It was also indebted, at the time of the East 
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High job, to Plaintiff Pacific Metals for materials 
furnished for use on other jobs (Williams' dep. R-6). 
Some time in April or May, 1965, near the in-
ception of its East High job, Olympus agreed with 
the Plaintiff Pacific Metals that both their names 
would appear as co-payees on all checks issued to 
Olympus by Mayne. (R. 47-49) (Stott's dep. R 5-6, 
Williams dep. R 4-7) 
Mayne agreed to the arrangement, and there-
after all check issued and delivered to Olympus by 
Mayne carried the names of Pacific Metals and 
Olympus as joint payees. At the time Pacific Metals 
and Olympus agreed to this arrangement, they did 
not have an agreement as to the amount each would 
receive from the checks when issued. This was to be 
determined by future negotiation by them after the 
issuance and delivery of the checks to Olympus. (R. 
47-49, Williams' dep. R 7-8, 16-17, 21-25; Stott's 
dep. R 7, 10-12) 
Several checks were delivered to Olympus prior 
to the check in question, and in each instance Olym-
pus and the Plaintiff Pacific Metals, after delivery, 
negotiated with each other as to the division of the 
proceeds of the check. The percentages taken by each 
always varied. (R. 47-49, Williams' dep. R 7-8, 16-
17, Stott's dep. R 6, 24-27, 29, 30, 37) 
The check in question was not endorsed by the 
Plaintiff Pacific Metals, nor did it receive any por-
tion of the money represented by the check. 
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After the check was delivered to Olympus, in-
stead of subjecting its division to negotiation with 
Plaintiff, Olympus, as its owner and the owner of 
the funds represented by it, deposited it in its ac-
count with the Defendant Tracy and immediately, 
by check, drew on its funds, and the Defendant Tra-
cy paid out all of the deposited amount to the holders 
of Olympus checks. (R. 7 4-75) 
Olympus never assigned any of the benefits or 
money payable from Mayne to Plaintiff, nor was an 
assignment agreed to, nor did Plaintiff have an 
agreed interest in any amount or any interest in the 
check nor the funds represented by the check. It 
merely had a right to negotiate with Olympus, after 
issuance, as to the division thereof. (R. 47-49, Wil-
liams' dep. R 4, 7-8, 16-17, 21-22, 23-25) 
Kenneth L. Williams, the Plaintiff Pacific Me-
tals' Assistant District Manager, and Clark B. Stott, 
President of Olympus, represented their respective 
companies in reaching the agreement under consid-
eration (Stott's deposition R. 2-4; Williams' deposi-
tion R. 2-8) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUM MARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiff Pacific Metals claims that it had 
an agreement with Olympus that it was to receive 
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all of the Olympus monies coming from the East 
High job with Mayne and that it had no obligation 
to allow Olympus any proceeds of the checks if it so 
elected. The evidence does not support its position. 
On the contrary, the evidence is clear that, after the 
rhecks were delivered, Olympus and the Plaintiff 
would then negotiate, future negotiations, as to the 
portion each would receive, which was done on all 
prior issued checks, and the pro rate was never the 
same. 
This was necessary to enable Olympus to com-
plete its contract with Mayne for it had to pay other 
suppliers for materials used on the job, its labor 
force, overhead, and the purchase of equipment. 
(Stott dep. R 12, 22-25) 
The testimony of both Mr. Williams, Plaintiff's 
Division Manager, and Mr. Stott, of Olympus, who 
represented their respective companies in providing 
future negotiations and for the arrangement of 
joint payees, is substantially the same. 
QUESTIONS BY MR. DAINES TO MR. WILLIAMS 
Q. And what was done with the money, with 
each check? 
A. Well, as much as possible I would try to 
get as much of it as I could. I controlled 
the checks. Our agreement was that 
Clark - Mr. Stott again - would bring 
those down, and I know on two occasions, 
and I can't remember on the others, we 











these, and I got a cashier's check for our 
amount, and then we issued - I think 
this is how we did it - we issued them a 
check, one of our own checks. 
Now, I take it that on each check that 
was issued by the Mayne people, you 
yourselves, meaning, of course, Pacific 
and Olympus, that you and Mr. Stott ne-
gotiated between you how much money 
that the Pacific Metals would receive 
from the check and how much would be 
received - how much Pacific Metals 
would get? 
Yes. 
That was the understanding or agree-
ment you had when you and Mr. Stott 
entered into the arrangement where both 
names would appear as co-payees, was 
it not? 
Yes. 
That after the check was issued, that 
then you representing Pacific Metals and 
Mr. Stott representing the Olympus 
Heating and Air Conditioning would ne-
gotiate the amount that each company 
was to receive? 
Yes. 
And that's what you did with reference 
to all of the checks which were issued 
prior to the check of October 18, 1965 -
As I recall. 
(Williams' dep. R 7-8) 
Well this check was also - the amount 
received by you and the amount received 
8 
• 
by the Olympus people was subject to 
negotiation, wasn't it? 
A. It was subject to negotiation, but I was 
the controlling factor on it. If I had de-
manded all of it, I wouldn't have put my 
endorsement on it until the agreement 
had been reached. 
Q. And he didn't have to put his endorse-
ment on it until he arrived at an under-
standing, did he? 
A. Then it would have been a standstill. 
Q. I see. 
A. But our agreement was that this would 
come to us. This is - better not say any-
thing. 








So as to any money paid on a joint payee 
check, the debtor - your signature has 
to appear along with that of the debtor? 
Yes, sir. 
Now, you stated in answer to a previous 
question that the agreement with Mr. 
Stott was that you would control their 
disposition of checks made payable joint-
ly to Olympus and Pacific Metals? 
Yes. 
Now, what do you mean by "control"? 
Well, maybe that's an improper word to 
use. I don't know. That he couldn't just 
promiscuously come down and say, "Here 
is five hundred bucks on account", or 
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something to that effect. That I would 
have to have a fair amount of the check 
made out payable jointly to us or if - J 
can't remember our conversation. I am 
sure that I would have tried to get it all 
if at all possible because an indebtedness 
was owed to us, and my prime responsi-
bility to our company was to collect that 
indebtedness. 
Q. Well, now, referring - could you have 
taken it all on these previous checks? 
MR. DAINES: Object to that as leading and 
suggestive and calls for a conclusion. 
Q. Well, was there - let me ask you this: 
Was there any conversation with respect 
to your taking all of any particular check 
on these joint payee checks? 
A. Oh, as I recall, I am sure that I - one 
occasion I know I tried to get more than 
what I eventually took, which I can't re-
member the exact amount, but we all 
knew that he was in financial difficulty, 
or there would be no need for this in the 
first place, and consequently it was a 
matter of who could get - if I could get 
more, I would, but I didn't want to close 
the man out. 
Q. Was there any specific agreement to pay 
a portion of this check to Olympus? 
A. No. There was no pre-arranged discus-
sions of who would get what out of a 
check until the time actually came that 
he had a check in his hand. 
(William R. 23-24) 
This was also the substance of the testi-
mony of Mr. Stott of Olympus. 
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QUESTION BY MR. MESERVY 
Q. What was the general context of the con-
versation? 
A. Well, mainly, that I did agree with him 
that - and we also contacted D i c k 
Brown of Mayne Plumbing and Heating 
- and asked if it would be okay with 
them if they would make out the joint 
checks or that the checks, jointly, with 
Olympus Heating and Pacific Metals, 
and Dick Brown agreed that this would 
be all right with him, thus enabling us 
to continue to complete the job and do 
the job. 
But our conversation, to a certain 
extent, was, that we, in allowing them to 
have joint check - that there would be 
times when, of course, we had to cover 
our payroll and had to cover other sup-
pliers, that we would possibly require 
some of that money, depending upon how 
our collections on other jobs came in; and 
there was several checks up prior to this 
particular check that we are concerned 
with here, that we did divide the pro-
ceeds on. 
But this wasn't a fixed amount on 
any particular check; and it was more or 
less based, each time, upon what the bal-
ance of the account showed with Pacific 
Metals. 
(Deposition of Mr. Stott R. 5-6) 
Q. Now Mr. Stott, you have already testifi-
ed you don't recall, specifically the lang-
uage at the discussion. At the conclusion 
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of the discussion, what was your under. 
standing as to when the entire balance 
of the indebtedness to Pacific Metals 
would be paid off? 
MR. DAINES: Just one moment - we ob-
ject; that is suggestive and is leading; fur. 
ther, it calls for a conclusion of the witness 
and not as to what the agreement was. ' 
MR. CHRISTIAN: May I further object on 
the ground, it would not - what his under-
standing is would not be binding upon the 
Bank of Salt Lake. 
MR. DAINES: Nor is it binding upon Tracy. 
Collins Bank & Trust Company. 
MR. GREENWOOD: You may answer. 
A. Well, I believe this is correct. I believe 
that we used the job, like I say, with the 
provision that there was other material 
men; there was labor to be paid by what-
ever profits, and so forth, that would be 
forthcoming from the job; and, of course, 
this is an amount that you couldn't put 
your finger on; but our agreement was, 
we would utilize the joint check system 
to purchase the materials that were need· 
ed for the job and to pay off the old in· 
debtedness. 
But I don't recall, specifically, whe· 
ther we said, "Well, you would have all 
of the money," or completely pay off all 
of the account because I am sure that the 
Pacific Metals, or anyone else, would re· 
alize there are other material - men and 
labor to be paid; and, like I say, I just 
don't remember the exact conversation; 
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but, other than that, we were trying to 
secure our position, and, then, the ac-
count. 
Q. Now, isn't it true that, in that discussion, 
it was discussed that the account would 
be paid in full out of your -
MR. DAINES: Just a moment - we object 
to that; it is suggestive and leading. 







Out of this particular job; that the ac-
count with the Pacific Metals would be 
paid in full at the conclusion of the job? 
I don't know as to whether this was stat-
ed, specifically. I believe our conversa-
tion was nothing along the lines that we 
would attempt to do this, but whether it 
was a definite conclusion that we would 
be able to do it, I don't - I just don't 
recall; and I'm sure that we had the un-
derstanding that we would attempt to do 
this. 
This, then, was discussed in the meeting? 
Well, I believe something along these 
lines, yes. I believe this was - was an 
attempt to clean up the account and in 
full. 
Now, in reference to the joint-payee 
checks, you mentioned that there was an 
indication and discussion at the time that 
there would be certain times when you 
would need portions of the checks; was 
there anything discussed as to what ba-




Q. W?o was to control what portion you re-
ceived? 
MR. DAINES: We object to that; that calls 
for suggestive and leading - calls for a con-
clusion. Why don't we have the conversation 
about it? 
Q. Was there anything in reference to the 
discussion that you had which related to 
who would control the portion that you 
were to receive out of each check? 
A. No. I believe, that, each time the check 
was received, that Mr. Williams and my-
self would get together on that particu-
lar check and arrive at a satisfactory 
conclusion, so there was nothing - noth-
ing set in; it was all just a matter of ne-
gotiations on an individual-check basis. 
(Deposition of Mr. Stott R 9-11) 
Since all Plaintiff had was a right to negotiate 
with Olympus as to the amount it would receive 
from each check after issuance and delivery, this 
agreement falls because of uncertainty and inde· 
finiteness, and Tracy's Motion for Summary J udg· 
ment should have been granted and Plaintiff's de· 
nied. 
There was never an assignment of any interest 
from Olympus to Plaintiff. (Williams' deposition 
R. 4) 
A check does not operate as an assignment of 
any part of a fund. 
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Inasmuch as the transaction, upon which this 
action is brought, occurred in October 1965, the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law is applicable rather than 
the Commercial Code. The pertinent provisions of 
the N.I.L. as incorporated into the Utah Code, 1953, 
Annotated, provide as follows: 
44-3-2. "Check" defined. - A check is a bill 
of exchange drawn on a bank, payable on de-
mand. Except as herein otherwise provided, 
the provisions of this title applicable to a bill 
of exchange payable on demand apply to a 
check. 
44-2-2. Bill not an asignment of funds in 
hands of drawee. - A bill of itself does not 
operate as an assignment of the funds in the 
hands of the drawee available for the pay-
ment thereof, and the drawee is not liable on 
the bill unless and until he accepts the same. 
As to non-assignability of funds by a check, 
AM JUR 2nd states the law is as follows: 
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments 
Act, the provision, which has been applied in 
a number of cases, is that a check, of itself, 
does not operate as an assignment of any part 
of the funds to the credit of the drawer with 
the Bank. The provision of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code is substantially the same. It is 
therein provided that a check or other draft 
does not of itself operate as an assignment of 
any funds in the hands of the drawee avail-
able for its payment." 10 AM JUR 2nd Page 
531, Sec. 562. 
For Plaintiff to recover against Tracy it must 
15 
establish that it owned the check or proceeds there-
of, and if not, then it has no right to action against 
this Defendant, and its recourse is against Olympus 
for the agreed value of the materials supplied: 
American National Bank vs. First National Bank, 
277 Pac. 2nd 951, 130 Colo. 557 (1954); Hi-Way 
Motor Co. vs. Service Motor Co., 68 Utah 65, 249, 
Pac. 133; Mullner vs. McCromic & Co., Banker, 69 
Utah 557, 257 Pac. 658. 
Since there was no agreement between Pacific 
Metals and Olympus as to the amount each would 
receive, and, that the amount would be determined 
after delivery, by negotiation, Pacific Metals had no 
right to its possesion or ownership. 
A contract which relies upon future negotiation 
as to its terms is void for uncertainty, 17 AM JUR 
2nd, page 362, Section 26, and the definiteness of a 
contract is determined as of the time it is made, 17 
AM JUR 2nd, Page 415 Sec. 76. In order to be bind· 
ing, a contract must be definite and certain as to its 
terms. 
"It is fundamental that no person may be 
subjected by law to a contractual obligation, 
unless the character of the obligation is de· 
finitely fixed by an express or implied. ag~ee· 
ment of the parties. In order to be bmdmg, 
an agreement must be definite and certain~ 
to its terms and requirements; it must identi· 
fy the subject matter and spell out the. essen· 
tial commitments and agreements with re· 
spect thereto," 17 AM JUR 2nd, Pages 413· 
414, Sec. 75. 
16 
and in this regard and as to future negotiations, 
this Court said in Hi-Way Motor Co. vs. Service Mo-
f,.or Co., supra: 
"It is no doubt true that, unless the minds of 
Hyrum Jensen and the manager of appellant 
had fully met respecting all of the essential 
terms of the alleged contract for the sale of 
the Ford sedan and the purchase of the Star 
sedan, the alleged contract failed of consum-
mation, and hence appellant cannot recover 
damages for a breach thereof, nor can it sus-
tain an action of trover for the value of the 
old sedan. It certainly is true that: 
In order that theatre may be an agreement, 
the parties must have a distinct intention 
common to both and without doubt or dif-
ference. Until all understand alike, there can 
be no assent, and, therefore, no contract. 
Both parties must assent to the same thing in 
the same sense, and their minds must meet 
as to all the terms." 13 C.J. 263, paragraph 
48. 
Further: 
"Where the parties have left an essential part 
of the agreement for future determination, 
it is no doubt correct to say that the contract 
is not completed." 6 R.C.L. p. 643, paragraph 
59. 
"It seems entirely unnecessary to multiply 
authority upon a proposition so elementary as 
the one here in question, and we shall refrain 
from doing so." (underscoring added) 
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As we have pointed out, the check did not 
amount to an assignment of any funds, nor was 
there an equitable assignment, as the test of an e4ui~ 
table assignment is whether a debtor would be jus-
tified in paying a debt to the person claiming to be 
the assignee (6 AM JUR 2nd, Page 266, Sec. 83), 
and the transfer must be of such a character that 
the fund holder can safely pay the assignee and may 
be compelled to do so although forbidden by the as-
signor. Christmas vs. Russel, 20 L.Ed. 762, Long vs. 
Farmers State Bank, 147 F. 360. This would also 
apply in determining whether or not the Plaintiff 
had any property interest in the check. In other 
words, could Pacific Metals have made a demand on 
Mayne to pay all of the proceeds of a check directly 
to it, omitting Olympus as a co-payee of the check1 
Assuming that Mayne had omitted Pacific Me-
tals as co-payee on the check it would not have had 
a claim against Mayne, for it could not have been 
determined and it cannot now be determined how 
much of the money represented by the check Pacific 
Metals was intitled to. 
Plaintiff had no ownership in the check, nor 
was it entitled to possession at the time of the alleged 
conversion, the rule is that Plaintiff must be the 
owner or that he is in possession or entitled to pos-
session at the time of the alleged wrong. None of 
these facts exist here. Hi-Way Motor Co. vs. Service 
Motor Co. (Utah) supra; National Producers Dis· 
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tributors, Inc., vs. Miles & Myers, Inc., 75 Idaho 
460, 274 Pac. 831. 
POINT II 
IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES 
NOT PRESENT AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR 
THE DETERMINATION BY A TRYER OF 
THE FACTS. 
While it is our position the evidence is clear 
there was no agreement between Pacific Metals and 
Olympus giving Pacific Metals the ownership of the 
proceeds of the check, and our Motion of Summary 
Judgment should have been granted and Pacific 
Metals' denied, if the Court believes otherwise, then 
we assert the evidence presents an issue of fact to 
be determined by the Trial Court as to whether or 
not Pacific Metals was its owner, or was Pacific 
Metals limited to a right to negotiate, in the future, 
as to what portion of the funds of each check it was 
entitled to? Should the latter be determined to be 
the agreement, then Pacific Metals would have no 
right of recovery, as hereinbefore pointed out. 
The law is plain that a Summary Judgment 
should not be granted if there is any genuine issue 
of fact to be tried. 
As stated in Young vs. Felornia, (Utah) 244 
P. 2d 862, 121 Utah 646: 
"In respect to a summary judgment, Rule 
56 ( c) U.R.C.P. provides: 
'The judgment sought shall be rendered 
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fort~w~th if th~ pleadings, depositions and 
a?m1~s10ns on file, together with the affida-
v1 ts, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issu~ as to an.y material fact, and that the 
movmg party is entitled to a judgment, as a 
mater of law.' 
Under this rule, it is clear that if thel'e 
is any genuine issue as to any material fact 
the motion should be denied." ' 
Not only is this the rule, but it is also the rule 
that every inference fairly arising from the plead-
ings, depositions, admissions and affidavits is to be 
given in favor of the one against whom the motion 
for summary judgment is asked. 
This Court stated in Morris vs. Farns· 
worth Motel et al, 259 P. 2nd 297, 123 Utah 289: 
"Under such circumstances, the party against 
whom the summary judgment is granted, is 
entitled to the benefit of having the Court 
consider all the facts presented and every in· 
f erence fairly arising therefrom in the light 
most favorable to him, which we do in review· 
ing the incident." 
And summary judgment must be denied if con· 
flicting inferences can be drawn from the evidence 
and if reasonable men might reach different con· 
clusions: 
"To justify the summary judgment, it mu~t 
appear that the evidence entered in oppos1· 
tion thereto is either too incredible to be ac· 
cepted by reasonable minds or is without legal 




~lenied if the evidence is such that conflicting 
mferences could be drawn therefrom or if 
reasonable men might reach different conclu-
sions. (3 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE, Barron and Holtzoff, Sec. 1234, 
Page 135-136)" 
"And one who moves for summary judgment 
has the burden of demonstrating clearly that 
there is no genuine issue of fact. Any doubt 
as to the existence of such an issue is resolved 
against him. The evidence presented at the 
hearing is liberally construed in favor of the 
party opposing the Motion and he is given the 
benefit of all favorable inferences which 
might reasonably be drawn from the evidence. 
Facts asserted by the party opposing the Mo-
tion and supported by Affidavits or other evi-
dentiary material, must be taken as true. (3 
FEDERAL PRACTICE A N D PROCED-
URE, Barron and Holtzoff, Sec. 1235, Pages 
139-141." 
further 
"The fact that both parties have moved for 
summary judgment does not establish that 
there is no issue of fact. A party may concede 
that there is no issue if his legal theory is ac-
cepted and yet maintain that there is a gen-
uine dispute as to material facts if his oppon-
ent's theory is adopted. Thus, both motions 
should be denied if the Court finds that there 
is actually a genuine issue as to a material 
fact. If both parties move for summary judg-
ment each concedes and affirms that there is 
no is~ue of fact only for purposes of his own 
motion. (3 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
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PROCEDURE, Barron and Holtzoff Sec 
1239, P. 176-177)" ' , 
While we urge that a consideration of the testi. 
mony submitted in the depositions of Mr. Williams 
and Mr. Stott establishes that their agreement was 
to the effect that all Plaintiff had was a future 
right of negotiation as to what each would receive 
from the checks, and such agreement was void for 
uncertainly, if the Court believes otherwise, we sub· 
mit there was a material issue of fact for determin-
ation by the Trial Court, which could not be dis· 
posed of on a motion for summary judgment as to 
just what the agreement of the parties was, that is, 
whether Pacific Metals owned all of the proceeds of 
the check, or was the amount it was to receive to be 
subsequently agreed upon. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out herein, Appellant Tra-
cy-Collnis Bank and Trust Company respectfully 
prays the Court to set aside and vacate said sum· 
mary judgment and direct the Trial Court to grant 
Tracy-Collins' motion for summary judgment, or, 
in the alternate, to remand the cause for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. DELOS DAINES 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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